MARGO K. BRODIE, District Judge:
Plaintiff Robert Graham and his son, J.G., filed the above-captioned action on August 27, 2008, alleging that the City of New York and New York City Police Department ("NYPD") officers violated their constitutional rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and committed the state torts of assault, battery, intentional inflict of emotional distress, false arrest, abuse of process, and various forms of negligence. (Docket Entry No. 1.) In a Second Amended Complaint filed on August 28, 2009, Defendants William Glenn and Andrew Ugbomah were personally named. (Docket Entry No. 18.) By Memorandum and Order dated August 17, 2011, United States District Judge Kiyo A. Matsumoto
At the conclusion of trial, Defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law. The Court reserved judgment and submitted the case to the jury for deliberations. (Minute Entry dated August 13, 2014.) The jury deliberated and returned a verdict
The Court assumes familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of this case as set forth in earlier decisions concerning this matter. See Graham v. City of New York, 928 F.Supp.2d 610 (E.D.N.Y.2013) (granting in part and denying in part motion for summary judgment); Graham v. City of New York, No. 08-CV-3518, 2011 WL 3625074 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2011) (granting motion for partial summary judgment as to J.G.'s claims); Graham v. City of New York, No. 08-CV-3518, 2010 WL 3034618 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2010) (overruling Magistrate Judge's grant of plaintiffs' motion for protective order, denying motion for a protective order). The Court briefly summarizes the testimony as presented at trial.
On June 8, 2007, at approximately 5:30 PM, Plaintiff and his four-year old son, J.G., were in their vehicle on Church Avenue, near the intersection of East 96th Street in Brooklyn, New York. (Tr. 310:14-311:22.) Defendant police officers Glenn and Ugbomah were in their marked police vehicle on Church Avenue, attempting to respond to a 9-1-1 call regarding an emergency at Church Avenue and Rockaway Parkway, one block from Plaintiff's location. (Tr. 65:22-67:11.) As the officers' vehicle approached the intersection of Church Avenue and East 96th Street, they did not have their lights or sirens on. (Tr. 68:18-69:16.) Glenn and Ugbomah pulled behind Plaintiff and attempted to get around Plaintiff's vehicle, chirping the sirens at Plaintiff. (Tr. 70:1-71:15.) When Glenn realized that they could not drive any further due to the traffic conditions, caused by a red light at the intersection, Glenn pulled into the bus stop to Plaintiff's right, behind a bus that was pulling out of the stop and into traffic. (Tr. 70:18-72:10, 74:25-76:10, 312:14-313:24.) The police car became boxed in, and Glenn could not maneuver around either the bus or the traffic in the street, and he gestured to Plaintiff to move right and backward, alongside the back of the bus, so that he could drive around Plaintiff's vehicle. (Tr. 76:11-24, 78:20-79:11, 83:6-18, 316:1-13.) Plaintiff gestured back by putting his hands up in an inquiring manner, attempting to indicate his belief that he could not move, which Glenn interpreted as a gesture of exasperation.
Plaintiff waited, in his vehicle, at the intersection of Church Avenue and East 96th Street for up to twenty minutes
Glenn pulled Plaintiff out of the vehicle, pushed Plaintiff against the car, handcuffed Plaintiff in front of J.G., and placed Plaintiff under arrest. (Tr. 101:21-102:20, 105:5-107:13, 322:22-323:7.) Glenn told Plaintiff that someone needed to pick up J.G., or J.G. would be left with the Administration for Children's Services. (Tr. 108:3-109:6, 327:8-24.) An acquaintance, Yvonne Fraser, was walking by and offered to take J.G. back to school, which she did, and Glenn placed Plaintiff in the back seat of his police vehicle. (Tr. 109:7-25, 290:18-291:17, 328:25-329:1.) The handcuffs were tight and Plaintiff complained that they were too tight, and irritated an area of his arm where he had recently had surgery. (Tr. 178:21-179:3, 325:21-326:23.) After Plaintiff continued to complain, Glenn addressed the problem either by loosening the handcuffs or removing them.
Glenn made two mistakes in filling out the summons, including failing to specify a subsection of the disorderly conduct statute. (Tr. 113:24-114:8.) Plaintiff reported to court, as required, on August 29, 2007, and received notice that a legally sufficient accusatory instrument was never filed in court and thus the matter had been dismissed. (Tr. 334:24-336:9.)
At the conclusion of Plaintiff's case, Defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the grounds that: (1) Plaintiff's claim for false arrest against Ugbomah fails as a matter of law because there is no evidence of intent to confine Plaintiff; (2) Plaintiff's claim for false arrest against Glenn fails because Glenn had probable cause to arrest for failure to yield to an emergency vehicle and for obstruction of governmental administration; (3) Plaintiff's claim for excessive force fails because the force used was de minimis; (4) Plaintiff's assault and battery claim fails because Glenn's contact with Plaintiff was privileged; (5) there was insufficient evidence to support Plaintiff's claims against Ugbomah on a failure to intervene theory; and (6) Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity and state law immunity for all claims. (Tr. 448:25-452:1.) The Court reserved ruling on Defendants' motion,
The jury found that Plaintiff had proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Glenn falsely arrested him on June 8, 2007, and that Ugbomah failed to intervene in the false arrest. (Verdict Sheet, Ct. Ex. 1 at 1, Docket Entry No. 100.) It determined that Plaintiff had not proved his other claims by a preponderance of the evidence. (Id. at 1-2.) Plaintiff was awarded $150,000 in compensatory damages and no punitive damages. (Id. at 2.) The jury also made findings of fact on a special verdict sheet, separate from the general verdict sheet. (Special Verdict Sheet, Ct. Ex. 2, Docket Entry No. 100-1.) The questions and answers found by the jury are reproduced below:
(Id.) After the jury presented its findings, Defendants renewed their Rule 50 motion
Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a court to set aside a jury's verdict if the court finds that "a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find" as it did. Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a)(1), (b); Cash v. Cty. of Erie, 654 F.3d 324, 333 (2d Cir. 2011) (Judgment as a matter of law is only appropriate "when `a party has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial and the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue.'" (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a)(1))). In reviewing a motion brought under Rule 50, "[t]he court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant and `give that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences that the jury might have drawn in his favor from the evidence,'" bearing in mind that a jury is free to believe or disbelieve any part of a witness' testimony. Jones v. Town of E. Haven, 691 F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir.2012) (quoting Zellner v. Summerlin, 494 F.3d 344, 371 (2d Cir.2007)); Zellner, 494 F.3d at 371. Accordingly, the court may "disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe." Zellner, 494 F.3d at 371 (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 135, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000)). The moving party thus bears a heavy burden, especially where, as here, "the jury has deliberated in the case and actually returned its verdict in favor of the non-movant." Cash, 654 F.3d at 333 (internal quotation marks omitted); Bakalor v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., No. 11-CV-2911, 2013 WL 3185546, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 24, 2013). "A judgment notwithstanding the verdict may only be granted if there exists such a complete absence of evidence supporting the verdict that the jury's findings could only have been the result of sheer surmise and conjecture, or the evidence in favor of the movant is so overwhelming that reasonable and fair minded persons could not arrive at a verdict against it." Wiercinski v. Mangia 57, Inc., 787 F.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir.2015) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Cash, 654 F.3d at 333.
Pursuant to Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, "[a] court may grant a new trial `for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court....'" Raedle v. Credit Agricole dosuez, 670 F.3d 411, 417 (2d Cir.2012)
Defendants contend that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff's false arrest claim because (1) the evidence in the record was not legally sufficient to form a basis for the jury's verdict, because Defendants had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for obstructing governmental administration ("OGA"), and (2) Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity and state law immunity because it was objectively reasonable for them to believe that they had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for OGA.
In assessing Fourth Amendment claims of false arrest brought under Section 1983, courts generally look to the law of the state in which the arrest is alleged to have occurred. Russo v. City of Bridgeport, 479 F.3d 196, 203 (2d Cir. 2007). "To avoid liability for a claim of false arrest, an arresting officer may demonstrate that either (1) he had probable cause for the arrest, or (2) he is protected from liability because he has qualified immunity." Simpson v. City of New York, 793 F.3d 259, 265 (2d Cir.2015) (citing Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 852 (2d Cir.1996)); Thompson v. City of New York, 592 Fed. Appx. 36, 37 (2d Cir.2015) (noting that probable cause is a complete defense to a false arrest claim, whether it is asserted under New York state law or Section 1983); Jaegly v. Couch, 439 F.3d 149, 152 (2d Cir.2006) (noting that, under New York law, probable cause is a complete defense to a claim of false arrest). "An arresting officer has probable cause [for an arrest] when the officer has `knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information of facts and circumstances that are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing a crime[.]'" Simpson, 793 F.3d at 265 (quoting Weyant, 101 F.3d at 852); Gonzalez v. City of Schenectady, 728 F.3d 149, 155 (2d Cir.2013) (same). Under New York Law, a person is guilty of OGA when he intentionally (1) "prevents or attempt[s] to prevent" (2) a public servant, from (3) performing an official function (4) "by means of intimidation, physical force or interference, or by means of any independently unlawful act...." N.Y. Penal Law § 195.05; see also Cameron v. City of New York, 598 F.3d 50, 68 (2d Cir.2010) (quoting Lennon v. Miller, 66 F.3d 416, 424 (2d Cir.1995)); Zellner, 494 F.3d at 376.
Defendants argue that there is no legally sufficient basis to find Glenn and Ugbomah liable for false arrest because Plaintiff refused to comply with two of Glenn's lawful orders, and "refusal to comply with a lawful order can constitute probable cause to arrest for" OGA. (Def. Mem. 13-14.) Specifically, Defendants argue that they had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff when he refused to back up his vehicle, and again when he refused to hand his documents — either driver's license or registration and proof of insurance — to Glenn upon request, both of which gave Glenn probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for OGA.
Defendants' argument improperly assumes that the jury must have accepted their version of the facts: that Plaintiff had space to move his vehicle, and that he did not provide his documents. Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, as the Court must, there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that Glenn did not have probable cause to arrest Plaintiff and therefore falsely arrested him. As to Plaintiff's apparent refusal to move his car, the jury concluded that Plaintiff could not have moved his vehicle either into the bus stop or backward when Glenn asked him to do so. (Special Verdict Sheet 1.) Despite Defendants' contention otherwise, Plaintiff's testimony clearly indicated that, although he could provide no specific measurement in feet, based on his experience driving, he believed that there was less than five feet of space behind him and he could not reverse his vehicle any further. (Tr. 392:23-393:4.) Plaintiff testified that he did not believe he could move, and that backing up any further would have been dangerous and may have caused an accident. (Tr. 316:6-17, 392:6-10.) The jury was free to credit Plaintiff's testimony over Glenn's contention that there was space for Plaintiff to move his vehicle into, and it is not the Court's province, on a Rule 50 motion, to disturb the jury's decision to do so. See Cash, 654 F.3d at 333; Zellner, 494 F.3d at 371 ("The court is not permitted to find as a fact a proposition that is contrary to a finding made by the jury."); Mickle v. Morin, 297 F.3d 114, 121 (2d Cir.2002) ("As the jury was not required to believe the disputed accounts given by either of the defendants, the court was required to disregard their testimony.... The court could not instead embrace defendants' versions of the circumstances as the basis for granting them judgment as a matter of law."); Slack v.
Similarly, the jury was not compelled to accept Defendants' contention that Plaintiff refused to hand his driver's license to Glenn.
Defendants contend that they are entitled to qualified immunity and state immunity, because it was objectively reasonable for them to believe that probable cause existed or, in other words, officers of reasonable
A police officer is entitled to qualified immunity from suit brought pursuant to Section 1983 if either "(1) his conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known, or (2) it was objectively reasonable for him to believe that his actions were lawful at the time of the challenged act." Simpson, 793 F.3d at 268 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227, 112 S.Ct. 534, 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991) (noting that the qualified immunity doctrine entitles officers to immunity from suit and is not just a defense from liability). The second prong of the test thus requires that officers only have "arguable probable cause," meaning "either (a) it was objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that probable cause existed, or (b) officers of reasonable competence could disagree on whether the probable cause test was met." Simpson, 793 F.3d at 268 (quoting Escalera v. Lunn, 361 F.3d 737, 743 (2d Cir.2004)); see also Zellner, 494 F.3d at 367 ("`[I]f officers of reasonable competence could disagree' as to whether probable cause existed, `immunity should be recognized.'" (alteration in original) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986))). "`[A]rguable' probable cause should not be misunderstood to mean `almost' probable cause. If officers of reasonable competence would have to agree that the information possessed by the officer at the time of arrest did not add up to probable cause, the fact that it came close does not immunize the officer." Gonzalez, 728 F.3d at 157 (quoting Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 86-87 (2d Cir. 2007)).
Under New York State law, qualified immunity has both an objective and subjective component: the officer must be acting within his discretion, and must not have been acting with bad faith or without a reasonable basis. Lore v. City of Syracuse, 670 F.3d 127, 166 (2d Cir.2012) (noting immunity only available for discretionary actions, and is not available if the officer was acting in bad faith); Hargroves v. City of New York, No. 03-CV-1668, 2014 WL 1271024, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2014) ("Under New York law, officers are entitled to qualified immunity where `there is bad faith or the action is taken without a reasonable basis.'" (quoting Blouin ex rel. Estate of Pouliot v. Spitzer, 356 F.3d 348, 363-64 (2d Cir.2004))); cf. Arzeno v. Mack, 39 A.D.3d 341, 833 N.Y.S.2d 480, 481 (2007) (finding that "since probable cause existed and [the defendant officer's] actions were reasonably based, no bad faith was shown and he was entitled to qualified immunity" as to false arrest claim). The objective components of the New York qualified immunity analysis are "essentially[] coextensive" with the reasonableness inquiry embedded in the federal standard. Hargroves, 2014 WL 1271024, at *3 (citing Jones v. Parmley, 465 F.3d 46, 64 (2d Cir.2006)).
Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity because Glenn's behavior was objectively reasonable based on the same factual contentions the Court rejected above.
Reviewing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and giving due deference to the jury's credibility determinations and reasonable factual conclusions, the Court will not set aside the verdict. Defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law is denied.
Defendants move for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59, arguing that a number of violations led to a seriously erroneous verdict or a miscarriage of justice. Defendants contend that (1) Plaintiff and his counsel engaged in repeated misconduct which showed "disregard" for the Court's authority and the judicial process, (2) the Court committed several errors in its evidentiary rulings and jury instructions, which led the jury to a seriously erroneous result, and (3) the jury reached an inconsistent verdict which was contrary to law and erroneous on its face.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff and his counsel engaged in "blatant misconduct"
A court considering a motion for a new trial based on opposing counsel's misconduct must be mindful that "not all misconduct of counsel taints a verdict to such a degree as to warrant a new trial." In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., 742 F.Supp.2d 460, 477 (S.D.N.Y.2010) (quoting Pappas, 963 F.2d at 540). A new trial is warranted only where counsel's conduct prejudices the opposing party or unfairly influences the jury's decision. Tesser v. Bd. of Educ. of Sch. Dist., 370 F.3d 314, 321 (2d Cir.2004); In re Fosamax, 742 F.Supp.2d at 477. Thus, in evaluating a motion for a new trial based on counsel's alleged misconduct, the court "must consider such a claim in the context of the trial as a whole, examining, among other things, the totality of the circumstances, including the nature of the comments, their frequency, their possible relevancy to the real issues before the jury, and the manner in which the parties and the court treated the comments." Claudio v. Mattituck-Cutchogue Union Free Sch. Dist., 955 F.Supp.2d 118, 144 (E.D.N.Y.2013) (quoting Levitant v. N.Y.C. Human Res. Admin., 914 F.Supp.2d 281, 311 (E.D.N.Y. 2012)); In re Fosamax, 742 F.Supp.2d at 477. Determining if counsel's conduct was so improper as to warrant a new trial is committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge. Patterson v. Balsamico, 440 F.3d 104, 119 (2d Cir.2006) (citing Matthews v. CTI Container Transp. Int'l Inc., 871 F.2d 270, 278 (2d Cir.1989)); see also Johnson v. Celotex Corp., 899 F.2d 1281, 1289 (2d Cir.1990) ("Great discretion is to be given the judge who was present throughout the trial and is best able to determine the effect of the conduct of counsel on the jury."); Claudio, 955 F.Supp.2d at 144.
Defendants first argue that Plaintiff's counsel violated the Court's in limine ruling that he could not argue that Defendants could have or should have taken an alternative course of action, as any alternate course of action was irrelevant to whether Glenn or Ugbomah acted lawfully. (Def. Mem. 4-5.) Plaintiff argues that Defendants' in limine request on this issue appeared only to ask the Court to prohibit Plaintiff from testifying as to alternate courses of action available to Defendants, but not inquiring or arguing as to them. (Pl. Opp'n 6-7.) Furthermore, Plaintiff argues that his counsel's four references to potential alternate courses of action did not result in a miscarriage of justice and, regardless, Defendants failed to contemporaneously object to the alleged improprieties. (Id. at 8.)
In Defendants' memorandum of law in support of their motions in limine, Defendants requested that the Court preclude "testimony or argument that the defendants could have or should have taken an alternate course of action," on the grounds it was not relevant. (Def. Mem. in Supp. of Mot. in Limine, annexed to Klein Decl.
Plaintiff's counsel did not violate the Court's ruling on the in limine motion, which prohibited Plaintiff from testifying as to anything he had not seen or observed. There was no clear ruling that Plaintiff could not inquire as to Glenn's determination of possible alternative actions available to him. At most, as Plaintiff argues, counsel was "mistaken as to the scope of the Court's ruling." (Pl. Opp'n 8.) This does not appear to be a "deliberate attempt" to "secure a favorable verdict, at all costs," (see Def. Mem. 5), but rather an attempt by Plaintiff's counsel to craft his argument without violating the Court's rulings. To the extent there was a misunderstanding at trial, Defendants objected to the questioning and the Court considered, and overruled, the objection, further indicating that the testimony was permissibly within the scope of its in limine ruling. See Guzman v. Jay, 303 F.R.D. 186, 192 (S.D.N.Y.2014) (noting that a motion for a new trial is not a vehicle for relitigating issues decided in in limine rulings, rejecting defendant's contention that plaintiff's counsel violated in limine rulings).
Defendants argue that Plaintiff's counsel violated the Court's ruling prohibiting him from arguing that Defendants failed to produce the second page of the summons. (Def. Mem. 5-7.) Plaintiff contends that this was not prejudicial, and that counsel only spent four sentences of the thirty-three pages of summation on the summons. (Pl. Opp'n 10-11.) Furthermore, Plaintiff argues that the Court gave ample warnings to the jury that the lawyers' statements are not evidence. (Id. at 11.)
At a pre-trial conference held on August 7, 2014, Plaintiff sought a "missing document" jury charge regarding the narrative portion of the summons Glenn served on Plaintiff. (Tr. of Aug. 7, 2014 Hr'g, annexed to McCann Decl. as Ex. B, 35:3-36:4.) Defendants explained that, typically, officers submit the page containing the narrative portion of the summons to the court and do not retain copies. (Id. at 36:7-9.) The Court determined that, if the officers had produced what was in their possession — in light of the fact that Plaintiff never made a motion to compel — a missing document charge would not be appropriate. (Id. at 37:18-38:10.) The Court indicated that Plaintiff was permitted to ask Glenn and Ugbomah what they wrote on the summons. (Id. at 38:10-14.) In proceedings prior to the start of trial, the Court reminded Plaintiff that he could ask Glenn whether the narrative portion of the summons was prepared, and what his typical practice was with regards to the summons. (Tr. 19:5-22:4.)
The Court finds that its warnings to counsel, combined with its repeated instruction to the jury that summations and statements from counsel are not evidence, were sufficient to counteract any prejudice that Plaintiff's allusions to the missing document may have caused. See Tesser, 370 F.3d at 322 (upholding determination that new trial was not warranted when defendants' counsel suggested plaintiff was hiding evidence, particularly in light of the fact that plaintiff's counsel was permitted to tell the jury that defendants could have called two individuals as witnesses but chose not to); Claudio, 955 F.Supp.2d at 149 (finding that warnings to counsel and limiting instructions to jury were sufficient to counteract "any question that might have been raised in the jury's mind" regarding counsel's improper line of questioning); see also Patterson, 440 F.3d at 119 (noting that attorneys are provided "`wide latitude in formulating their arguments' to the jury" on summation, and reversal for attorney's conduct during summation is rare (quoting Reilly v. Nat-West Mkts. Grp. Inc., 181 F.3d 253, 271 (2d Cir.1999))). The Court finds that the remarks were not unduly prejudicial or confusing, and thus do not provide a basis for a new trial.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff's counsel violated the Court's ruling prohibiting him from discussing the psychological impact of the incident on J.G. (Def. Mem. 7-9.) Defendants contend it was clearly orchestrated because counsel "closed on the prohibited testimony," stating that it was good that Ms. Fraser was there to remove J.G. from the situation, that he was "clearly affected" and that he did not "think kids remember everything that happens when
At the pre-trial conference on May 13, 2014, the Court ruled that J.G. was permitted to testify as to what he did and what he observed, but that Plaintiff's counsel was not permitted to ask J.G. if he was upset. (Tr. of May 13, 2014 Hr'g 40:3-19.) During J.G.'s testimony, Plaintiff's counsel asked J.G. "How is it ... that you remember this incident?" (Tr. 250:12-13.) Defendants objected, and at sidebar indicated their concern that Plaintiff was attempting to circumvent the Court's ruling. (Tr. 250:15-251:21.) Plaintiff indicated that J.G. would answer that he was shocked and that is what made the event memorable. (Tr. 251:9-24.) The Court permitted Plaintiff to lead the witness to elicit what he did that day, but warned counsel not to "go into whether or not it was a traumatic experience for him," stating that J.G.'s personal feelings were not relevant. (Tr. 251:25-23.) Plaintiff's counsel abided by the Court's rulings, but J.G. later volunteered the prohibited testimony on direct examination:
(Tr. 258:2-12.) J.G. similarly mentioned the effects of the events on cross-examination:
(Tr. 265:23-266:1.)
As an initial matter, J.G.'s response to both questions where he mentions "shock" are relevant to the extent that they explain why J.G. did not remember the particular events he was being asked about, and were responsive to the questions he had been asked. Furthermore, these two statements were unsolicited by Plaintiff's counsel, and Defendants made no objection to them during trial. Defendants contend that it is clear that Plaintiff's counsel "rehearsed" this with J.G., based on the fact that they both used the word "shock," and "orchestrated" a violation of the Court's ruling. Defendants point to the fact that Plaintiff referenced J.G.'s shock in closing argument as proof of that contention. (See Tr. 472:25-473:6 (noting that the incident "clearly affected" J.G.).) This speculation as to counsel's intentions is not supported by the record. Regardless, viewed in the context of the entire trial, this one small argument as to the emotional impact of the incident on J.G. was harmless, and there is no indication that it created any undue prejudice. Defense counsel began his summation by arguing that J.G.'s testimony was case determinative, (Tr. 498:22-499:3), reminded the jury that J.G. was not a party to the lawsuit, (Tr. 502:16-20), and encouraged the jury to believe J.G.'s testimony, (Tr. 504:8-506:20). Furthermore, defense
Defendants assert, and Plaintiff does not dispute, that Plaintiff requested that both parties avoid references to the Civilian Complaint Review Board's ("CCRB") investigation relating to this action. (Def. Mem. 10-11; Pl. Opp'n 14.) Defendants argue that Plaintiff violated this agreement by saying, on cross-examination, that he made a statement to the CCRB. (Def. Mem. 10-12.) Defendants further argue that this "obviously choreographed" violation caused "undue prejudice to [D]efendants by making the jury think that there had been an investigation into the allegations in this case when in fact [P]laintiff's complaint to CCRB was closed as `complainant uncooperative.'" (Def. Mem. 11.) Plaintiff contends that this was not part of a "win at all costs strategy," but rather an inadvertent mistake made in passing, using an acronym that not all jury members would be familiar with. (Pl. Opp'n 14.)
Upon request from Plaintiff's counsel on the second morning of trial, the Court determined that it would be appropriate for Plaintiff to cross-examine Glenn on whether there had been complaints against him by members of the community, but would not permit specifics on CCRB complaints or lawsuits. (Tr. 124:4-25.) On Plaintiff's cross-examination, defense counsel attempted to impeach Plaintiff with "a statement [made] the day after the incident." (Tr. 398:7-8.) Defense counsel read a portion of the statement, and asked Plaintiff if that was accurate. (Tr. 398:10-16.) Plaintiff asked to whom the statement was made, and both the Court and defense counsel stated that it was irrelevant. (Tr. 398:17-21.) When defense counsel asked "did you make the statement or not?" Plaintiff responded "I may have said that, yes, to the CCRB, if that's what you're referring to." (Tr. 398:22-24.) The testimony proceeded without comment, and Defendants did not object to the statement later in the proceedings.
These facts do not warrant a new trial. First, the reference to CCRB appeared to be inadvertent and happened once in a three-day trial. See Guzman, 303 F.R.D. at 193 (finding that a single reference to "CCR-" was a good-faith mistake that was corrected, that "most of prejudice stemming from the use of the term CCRB at trial was a result of the testimony of Defendant's own witness" and that the court was not convinced that the jury drew any inferences about the results of the investigation). Furthermore, the simple reference to the fact that Plaintiff may have given a statement to the CCRB following the incident would not necessarily lead the jury to draw any inference as to whether there was an investigation or the results of any investigation, nor is it clear to the Court that it would have any impact on the jury's ultimate verdict. See id. (denying motion for new trial on basis of reference to CCRB investigation, finding it
Defendants object that Plaintiff's counsel accused Glenn of acting pursuant to quotas with no good faith basis, and argue that this conduct warrants a new trial. (Def. Mem. 9-10.) Plaintiff's counsel asked Glenn two questions alluding to quotas, to which Defendants contemporaneously objected. (Tr. 59:16-24.) The Court sustained the objections and no answer was provided. (Id.) The Court instructed the jury at the beginning and end of trial that counsels' questions and arguments were not evidence, and if objections to questions were sustained, the jury should ignore the question. (Tr. 3:22-4:10, 542:19-24.) There is no suggestion that these two questions, asked in the course of a three-day trial, had any impact on the jury's verdict, and the Court does not find that this single, isolated incident of improper questioning warrants a new trial. See Lovejoy v. Gure-Perez, No. 10-CV-5748, 2014 WL 2459656, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. May 21, 2014) (finding no prejudice from plaintiff's "repeated[]" attempts to elicit testimony about excluded evidence, noting that counsel objected and the court sustained the objections, and had later instructed the jury that questions and arguments of counsel were not evidence); see also Smith v. Lightning Bolt Prods., Inc., 861 F.2d 363, 370 (2d Cir.1988) (finding single improper question of witness did not warrant new trial when court immediately struck the question and cautioned the jury to disregard it, and there was no further mention of the subject within the hearing of the jury).
Defendants argue that Plaintiff's counsel deliberately distorted Ugbomah's deposition testimony to indicate that Ugbomah was being untruthful, insinuating that Ugbomah remembered the entire incident after he had taken a break and he had the opportunity to discuss his testimony with his lawyer. (Def. Mem. 10.) Plaintiff argues that he did not distort Ugbomah's testimony. (Pl. Opp'n 13.)
On redirect examination, Plaintiff's counsel asked Ugbomah if, at his deposition, he could not recall the incident in question, which Ugbomah answered in the affirmative. (Tr. 244:24-245:3.) He then asked if "after a break, you then testified that all of a sudden, you had a vivid memory of the summons being issued after you [sic] initially saying you didn't?" (Tr. 245:12-14.) Ugbomah testified that he did not remember the summons being issued. (Tr. 245:17-18.) Plaintiff's counsel continued to ask Ugbomah if he testified — after returning from a break in the deposition — that he had a "vivid memory of the summons," (Tr. 245:20-246:21 (emphasis added)), at which point Ugbomah stated he did not remember, (Tr. 245:22). Plaintiff's counsel asked if Ugbomah had "any reason to doubt that you said all of a sudden after a break that you had a vivid memory of the incident," and Ugbomah said he did not remember. (Tr. 246:23-274:7 (emphasis added).) Upon further questioning, defense counsel asked Ugbomah: "What you said in your deposition is in the transcript that you were just shown, right?" to which Ugbomah answered in the affirmative.
Defendants have not submitted the relevant portions of Ugbomah's deposition transcript in support of the current motion, and the Court therefore cannot evaluate Defendants' contention that Plaintiff's counsel "deliberately distorted" the testimony. However, Plaintiff's counsel's initial questioning appropriately referred to Ugbomah's memory of the summons, and only his last question referred to the incident. There is no basis to conclude that this single inconsistency, considered in the context of the other questions and the re-cross examination by defense counsel, had any impact on the jury's determination as to Ugbomah's credibility or any of the ultimate issues decided by the jury.
Although not explicitly argued by Defendants, the Court will consider whether the Defendants' arguments regarding Plaintiff's and Plaintiff's counsel's alleged misbehavior, in the aggregate, amount to the alleged "pattern" of misconduct that would warrant a new trial as to Plaintiff's false arrest claim. See Claudio, 955 F.Supp.2d at 158 (citing Floyd v. Meachum, 907 F.2d 347, 355 (2d Cir.1990)). Having seen the trial, observed the witnesses and counsel, and the demeanor of both counsel and the jury, the Court cannot conclude that Plaintiff's and his counsel's "statements and conduct had adversely impacted the defendant[s] and affected the outcome of the trial." See id. at 158-59; cf. Hopson v. Riverbay Corp., 190 F.R.D. 114, 122 (S.D.N.Y.1999) (finding new trial warranted when counsel made "numerous misstatements of fact and law and repeated acts of misconduct" including unfounded allegations that opposing party lied and had been subject to disciplinary proceedings, and counsel continued to mislead the jury over sustained objections in summation).
In the context of the entire trial, the few remarks by Plaintiff and his counsel, discussed above — most of which did not bear on ultimate liability at trial — were de minimis or were dealt with through clear instructions to the jury at the beginning and the end of trial, and thus a new trial is not warranted on this ground. See O'Hara v. City of New York, 570 Fed.Appx. 21, 25 (2d Cir.2014) (finding curative instruction sufficient to avoid undue prejudice of challenged rebuttal argument); Hopson, 190 F.R.D. at 122 ("Conduct that is `de minimis in the context of the entire trial' or that is appropriately dealt with by curative instructions, is not sufficient to warrant a new trial." (quoting Pappas, 963 F.2d at 540)).
Defendants argue that "several of the Court's rulings caused a seriously erroneous result and a miscarriage of justice," including (1) prohibiting Defendants from discussing the substance of the emergency to which Defendants were responding; (2) preventing Defendants from conducting a "full" cross-examination of Plaintiff; (3) preventing Defendants from questioning Plaintiff about Dr. Dudley, Plaintiff's retained expert witness who was not called at trial; (4) refusing to instruct the jury that failure to follow a lawful order can constitute OGA; and (5) including a respondeat superior instruction in the jury charge.
A district court has broad discretion over the admission of evidence at trial. Kogut v. Cty. of Nassau, 789 F.3d 36, 47 (2d Cir.2015); Stampf, 761 F.3d at 203. A new trial may be warranted if the district court made substantial errors in admitting or excluding evidence, provided that the errors caused the jury to reach a
Defendants first argue that the Court erred in prohibiting them from discussing the nature or substance of the emergency to which they were responding, limiting them to only describing it as a "Priority 2" on a scale of one to five, one being the most urgent. (Def. Mem. 16.) Defendants contend that the nature of the emergency — an assault in progress — was relevant to their probable cause determination, and thus should have been permissible testimony. (Id. at 16-17.) Defendants argue that it "sterilized" their case and prevented them from "fully" explaining their course of action, especially in light of Plaintiff's arguments that they could have taken an alternative course of action. (Id. at 17.) Plaintiff argues that this ruling was proper and did not result in an unfair trial, as the nature of the emergency was not relevant and was prejudicial. (Pl. Opp'n 23-24.)
The fact that Defendants were responding to an emergency was relevant to the determination of whether Defendants had probable cause to believe that Plaintiff was committing OGA by interfering with their governmental function — the governmental function being the officers' response to the emergency and attempt to apprehend the perpetrator — but the nature of that emergency was not probative of whether Plaintiff was committing a crime. See Cameron, 598 F.3d at 68 (outlining elements of OGA violation, finding that effectuating an arrest is an official function). The Court determined that testimony as to the level of emergency was sufficient to convey the nature of the officers' "governmental function," but the substance of the emergency was not legally relevant to the Defendants' defense and would be unduly prejudicial to Plaintiff. (Tr. of Aug. 7, 2014 Pretrial Conference, excerpts annexed to McCann Decl. as Ex. B, 26:9-28:15, 29:5-19.) The jury heard testimony about what Defendants were doing and why, including testimony that Glenn and Ugbomah were responding to a "Priority 2" emergency and that emergencies are measured on a scale from 1 to 5 where 1 is the most urgent, and 2 is the second most urgent. (Tr. 67:8-13, 174:7-12.) Glenn also testified that they were responding in a "[stealth]-manner" to the emergency, without running their lights or sirens, so that they would not alert the
"A district court is accorded broad discretion in controlling the scope and extent of cross-examination...." Lidle v. Cirrus Design Corp., 505 Fed.Appx. 72, 76 (2d Cir.2012) (quoting United States v. Wilkerson, 361 F.3d 717, 734 (2d Cir. 2004)); SR Int'l Bus. Ins. Co. v. World Trade Ctr. Properties, LLC, 467 F.3d 107, 119 (2d Cir.2006) (noting that district courts have "wide latitude" in "controlling `the mode and order'" of evidentiary presentations at trial (quoting Fed.R.Evid. 611(a))). "[T]here is a long line of cases making clear the authority of district judges to impose reasonable time limitations on trials." E. Mishan & Sons, Inc. v. Homeland Housewares LLC, 580 Fed. Appx. 26, 28 (2d Cir.2014) (alteration in original) (quoting Lidle v. Cirrus Design Corp., 278 F.R.D. 325, 331 (S.D.N.Y.2011), aff'd, 505 Fed.Appx. 72 (2d Cir.2012)). "Generally, `[c]ross-examination should not go beyond the subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the witness's credibility.'" Lidle, 505 Fed.Appx. at 76 (alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R.Evid. 611(b)).
Defendants object to the length of their cross-examination of Plaintiff, arguing that the Court's trial-management decisions put Defendants in the position of either holding the jury late, causing them to be "disinterested" and "hostile" to Defendants, or cutting short their cross-examination of Plaintiff. (Def. Mem. 18-19.) Defendants contend that this forced choice signaled to the jury "that [D]efendants' examination was taking too long and was not an important part of this trial" and that, "by affording [P]laintiff ample time to conduct sprawling examinations while preventing [D]efendants from conducting a full examination of [P]laintiff," it caused a seriously erroneous result and is grounds for a new trial. (Id.) Plaintiff argues that the Court properly exercised its discretion to manage the trial, and Defendants have not shown that the time limitation caused them any prejudice. (Pl. Opp'n 25.)
At the end of Plaintiff's direct testimony on the afternoon of the second day of trial, at side-bar, the Court asked Defendants:
(Tr. 360:2-4.) Approximately twenty minutes into the cross-examination, (see Def. Mem. 18), in open court, the Court inquired if Defendants' counsel was "almost done" and reminded counsel that they agreed to finish the testimony that day, and counsel indicated that he wished to proceed until 5:30 PM. (Tr. 395:24-396:5.) The Court informed counsel that he had "ten minutes," referring to the earlier conversation. (Tr. 396:6.) Rather than indulging further delay at side-bar, the
(Tr. 405:1-18 (emphasis added).) Counsel asked three more questions, and then stated "I think I'm done," before he determined he had nothing further. (Tr. 406:1-21.) After Plaintiff's redirect examination, Defendants were given an opportunity to re-cross-examine Plaintiff, and chose not to do so. (Tr. 411:23-412:3.) Plaintiff rested, and Defendants informed the Court that they would not call any witnesses. (Tr. 412:7-413:5.) Ultimately, the testimony went until about 5:30 PM, and the jury was excused at 5:37 PM. (Tr. 414:1-14.)
Defendants have not shown any prejudice from the instruction to complete the cross-examination that evening. See Lidle, 278 F.R.D. at 331 (noting that in order to prevail on a claim that the imposed time limit was too short, a party must show how its cross-examination was curtailed and must show prejudice). First, Defendants make no mention of what other questions or evidence they would have elicited if not for the time limit, instead relying on their repeated assertion that they were denied a "full" examination.
Defendants contend that they should have been permitted to cross-examine Plaintiff as to his decision to retain an expert witness for trial, which expert had been criticized as unreliable in an unrelated proceeding in the Northern District of Iowa. (Def. Mem. 19-21.) Plaintiff argues that this line of questioning would have been improper and irrelevant. (Pl. Opp'n 26.)
Plaintiff retained Dr. Dudley, an expert witness, in preparation for this trial. Defendants sought to cross-examine Dr. Dudley about his testimony in a prior, unrelated litigation, where the Judge found him not credible. Plaintiff chose not to call Dr. Dudley to testify at trial, and Defendants sought to cross-examine Plaintiff about the fact that he retained Dr. Dudley solely for the purposes of this litigation and the fact that Dr. Dudley had been found not credible in an unrelated litigation. The Court did not permit this line of questioning, as the expert was not a treating physician and there was no basis to inquire as to Plaintiff's decision to retain an expert where Plaintiff did not present any expert testimony. (Tr. 270:4-281:3.)
Defendants appear to concede that this line of questioning would not be probative of any substantive issue raised on direct examination, as they rightly should. Defendants' contention that Plaintiff's retention of Dr. Dudley, an "unreliable" witness, in preparation for trial calls Plaintiff's credibility into question is hollow at best. As an initial matter, the question of Dr. Dudley's credibility was moot because he did not testify at trial. In any event, Plaintiff would not have been permitted to testify as to another witness's credibility. See Nimely, 414 F.3d at 397-98 (noting that it is improper for a witness to testify as to the credibility of another witness, either as an expert or fact witness, out of concerns for bolstering). Furthermore, this line of questioning was not probative of Plaintiff's credibility and posed a substantial risk of juror confusion and undue prejudice. See Parrish v. Sollecito, 280 F.Supp.2d 145, 165 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (denying motion for new trial, finding evidence was properly excluded to avoid prejudice and confusion). Expert witnesses, including doctors retained to evaluate physical and mental injuries, are routinely retained in anticipation of litigation. See, e.g., Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(4) (providing for disclosure of experts retained "in anticipation of litigation" expected to be called as witnesses at trial, limiting discovery of consultative experts); Agron
Erroneous or inadequate jury instructions may constitute grounds for a new trial, provided the errors are "prejudicial in light of the charge as a whole." Lore, 670 F.3d at 156. An erroneous jury instruction "misleads the jury as to the correct legal standard or does not adequately inform the jury on the law." Id. (quoting Perry v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 115 F.3d 143, 153 (2d Cir.1997)); see also Turley v. ISG Lackawanna, Inc., 774 F.3d 140, 152 (2d Cir.2014); Worytko v. Cty. of Suffolk, 285 Fed.Appx. 794, 795 (2d Cir. 2008) ("Where the court's instruction misleads the jury as to the correct legal standard or where it fails to adequately inform the jury on the law, it will be deemed erroneous. An erroneous jury instruction mandates a new trial unless the error is harmless." (quoting Cobb v. Pozzi, 363 F.3d 89, 112 (2d Cir.2004))). An error in a jury instruction is not prejudicial "when [the court is] persuaded it did not influence the jury's verdict." Townsend v. Benjamin Enters., Inc., 679 F.3d 41, 56 (2d Cir.2012). "An omission, or an incomplete instruction, is less likely to be prejudicial than a misstatement of the law." Lore, 670 F.3d at 156 (quoting Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 155, 97 S.Ct. 1730, 52 L.Ed.2d 203 (1977)). A new trial is not warranted if the instructions "read as a whole, presented the issues to the jury in a fair and evenhanded manner." Turley, 774 F.3d at 152 (quoting Lore, 670 F.3d at 156).
Defendants contend that the Court's refusal to instruct the jury that failure to follow a lawful order can constitute OGA warrants a new trial. (Def. Mem. 21-22.) Defendants raised this matter with the Court before trial, requesting a jury instruction that an officer has probable cause to arrest for OGA if the individual refuses to comply with an order from a police officer. (Defendants' Proposed Jury Instructions 8, Docket Entry No. 90.) In their proposed jury instructions, Defendants relied on two district court cases to support their contention. (See id. (citing Johnson v. City of New York, No. 05-CV-7519, 2008 WL 4450270, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2008) and Rasmussen v. City of New York, 766 F.Supp.2d 399, 403 (E.D.N.Y.2011))). The Court refused to add the proposed language. (Tr. 442:15-20.) Defendants' position is no more persuasive or consistent with New York State law now than it was when the Court denied their initial request for this jury instruction.
Failure to follow a police officer's instruction is not OGA in every circumstance, and a jury instruction adopting this reductionist view would run a serious risk of misleading the jury. Disobeying a police officer alone is not necessarily OGA, as "[c]ourts have made clear that the statute requires physical interference with police action," including encroachment on police officers' work, or some other independently unlawful act to support an OGA arrest. Hilderbrandt v. City of New York, No. 13-CV-1955, 2014 WL 4536736, at *4-6
The Court instructed the jury that Glenn contended he had probable cause to arrest for three crimes: failure to yield to an emergency vehicle, OGA, and disorderly conduct. (Tr. 553:23-554:3.) The Court defined probable cause as follows:
(Tr. 552:21-553:3.) As to OGA, the Court explained:
(Tr. 554:12-19.) In fact, the instruction mirrored the OGA statute closely. See N.Y. Penal Law § 195.05. Given the nuanced, fact-specific analysis that pervades the case law regarding probable cause to
Defendants argue that it was error for the Court to include a respondeat superior charge against the City of New York in the jury instructions. (Def. Mem. 22-23.) Defendants contend that liability against the City is not a question for the jury, but rather a question of law for the Court to decide. (Id. at 22.) Defendants object on the basis that it prejudiced the jury to award a higher verdict against the City, a "deep pocket" Defendant. (Id. at 22-23.) Plaintiff argues that it was legally correct to include the charge because Plaintiff brought a claim for respondeat superior liability, and omitting the instruction would make "no legal sense insofar it is the Court's job to present the jury with all applicable law necessary to evaluate [P]laintiff's claims prior to deliberation...." (Pl. Opp'n 28-29.)
The Court instructed:
(Tr. 560:19-23.) It further explained:
(Tr. 563:22-564:6.) These instructions do not mislead the jury as to the legal standard to be applied to Plaintiff's claim against the City of New York such that the instructions would warrant a new trial. See Holland v. City of Poughkeepsie, 90 A.D.3d 841, 935 N.Y.S.2d 583, 589 (2011) ("Moreover, unlike the claims pursuant to 42 [U.S.C.] § 1983, a municipality may be held vicariously liable for torts committed by its employee while acting within the scope of his or her employment," including false arrest. (citations omitted)). Furthermore, there is no evidence to support Defendants' "deep pocket" theory, as the jury made specific factual findings that support its verdict that Glenn is liable for false arrest. Because Defendants have presented only speculation to support the motion for a new trial on these grounds, the Court finds no risk of a miscarriage of justice.
Defendants contend that the jury's verdict is contrary to law and erroneous on its face because the jury found for Plaintiff as to the false arrest claim, but for Glenn as to the battery claim. (Def. Mem. 23.) Defendants argue that a battery must necessarily follow from an unlawful arrest. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that the verdict was not inconsistent, because, based on the jury charge, a jury could "reasonably conclude that although Glenn falsely arrested [P]laintiff, the force Glenn used to arrest [P]laintiff was no more than what Glenn
A jury verdict need not be consistent to be valid, and an inconsistency between general verdicts on a plaintiff's federal and state law claims does not necessarily require retrial. See Cash, 654 F.3d at 343 ("[C]onsistent jury verdicts are not, in themselves, necessary attributes of a valid judgment [in a civil action]." (alterations in original) (quoting Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1290 n. 17 (2d Cir.1969))). If the jury's general verdicts can be "harmonized rationally," the court need not order a new trial. See Kosmynka v. Polaris Indus., Inc., 462 F.3d 74, 82 (2d Cir.2006); see also Cunningham v. Town of Ellicott, 310 Fed.Appx. 448, 449 (2d Cir.2009) (noting that even if special verdict answers appear inconsistent with general verdict, if any view of the case makes them consistent, the case must be resolved that way); In re Vivendi Univ., S.A. Sec. Litig., 765 F.Supp.2d 512, 552 (S.D.N.Y.2011) ("It is well-settled that `[w]hen confronted with a potentially inconsistent jury verdict, the court must adopt a view of the case, if there is one, that resolves any seeming inconsistency.'" (alteration in original) (quoting Turley v. Police Dep't, 167 F.3d 757, 760 (2d Cir. 1999))).
Defendants failed to raise their inconsistency objection prior to the jury's discharge, and thus have waived this argument.
Defendants have failed to demonstrate that any potentially improper conduct on the part of Plaintiff and Plaintiff's counsel, rulings by the Court, or inconsistency in the jury verdict led to a seriously erroneous verdict or a miscarriage of justice, warranting a new trial. Thus, Defendants' motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59 is denied.
Defendants argue that the damages award is excessive and should be vacated and returned for a new trial as to damages, or, in the alternative, the award should be reduced as objectively unreasonable. (Def. Mem. 23-24.) Defendants contend that Plaintiff's injuries were only minor, including a headache and some wrist pain, and "garden variety" emotional damages. (Def. Reply Mem. 9-10.) Plaintiff argues that the award falls within a reasonable range for the type of physical and emotional injuries that Plaintiff suffered, and thus should be upheld. (Pl. Opp'n 31-35.)
A court has discretion to order a new trial if the verdict appears to be seriously erroneous, and this "discretion includes overturning verdicts for excessiveness and ordering a new trial without qualification, or conditioned on the verdict winner's refusal to agree to a reduction (remittitur)." Lore, 670 F.3d at 177 (quoting Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 433, 116 S.Ct. 2211, 135 L.Ed.2d 659 (1996)); see also Roberts v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 115 F.Supp.3d 344, 372-73, 2015 WL 4509994, at *24 (E.D.N.Y. July 27, 2015) ("A trial court may grant remittitur where it deems a damages verdict excessive."). In considering motions for a new trial or remittitur on a state law claim, "[t]he role of the district court is to determine whether the jury's verdict is within the confines set by state law, and to determine, by reference to federal standards developed under Rule 59, whether a new trial or remittitur should be ordered." Stampf, 761 F.3d at 204 (alteration in original) (quoting Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 435, 116 S.Ct. 2211); see Patterson, 440 F.3d at 119-20. Under New York law, an award is excessive or inadequate "if it deviates materially from what would be reasonable compensation." Stampf, 761 F.3d at 204 (quoting N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5501(c)); Lore, 670 F.3d at 177; Patterson, 440 F.3d at 119 (noting that the state standard requires "a more exacting review" than the federal standard). In reviewing the same motion on a federal claim, a court's review of a compensatory damage award is "narrow," and a jury's award may be set aside as excessive only when the award is "so high as to shock the judicial conscience."
"An individual subjected to a false arrest is entitled to two types of compensatory damages: (1) for loss of liberty and (2) for physical and emotional distress." Thomas v. Kelly, 903 F.Supp.2d 237, 262 (S.D.N.Y.2012)
Plaintiff was awarded $150,000 in compensatory damages for his false arrest claim. (Verdict Sheet 2.) Defendants argue that Plaintiff's single hour of confinement does not warrant an award greater than $15,000, which Defendants contend is more than twice the average damages awarded per hour of confinement. (Def. Mem. 26 (citing Robinson v. Holder, No. 07-CV-5992, slip op. at 14-16 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2008) report and recommendation adopted at 2008 WL 2875291 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2008))). However, this argument has two faults: first, Defendants only consider Plaintiff's loss of liberty, and not his physical or emotional damages resulting from the false arrest;
Mindful that a district court must afford some deference to a jury's determination of damages, the Court finds that the $150,000 award is not excessive. While it may be at the higher end of reasonable awards, the jury's determination of damages does not deviate materially from a reasonable compensation awarded in similar cases and is not so high as to shock the judicial conscience. See Martinez, 445 F.3d at 160 (noting that the "least intrusive" way to calculate remittitur would be to remit the award "only to the maximum amount that would be upheld by the district court as not excessive"). While the parties failed to bring to the Court's attention any case directly comparable to this one, $150,000 is within the range of reasonable awards for Plaintiff's combined injuries including (1) approximately one hour of lost liberty, (2) some minor physical pain and injury, and (3) past and future emotional harm, including fear, panic and humiliation.
The parties agree that the testimony showed that Plaintiff was detained for approximately one hour, during which time he was sitting either in his own vehicle or in the back of Glenn's patrol vehicle on a warm June day, which itself warrants compensation for loss of liberty. Additionally, Plaintiff suffered wrist pain during the incident, a headache following the incident, and sustained marks on his wrists from the handcuffs. (Tr. 293:20-294:6, 326:12-23, 344:20-345:24, 367:8-24; Pl. Ex. 5.) These injuries alone may warrant damages in the amount that Defendants urge the Court to adopt. See Kelly v. Kane, 98 A.D.2d 861, 470 N.Y.S.2d 816, 818 (1983) (upholding compensatory damage award of $5000 (approximately $12,000 in 2015 dollars)
For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies Defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and Defendants' motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court also denies Defendants' motion to vacate or reduce the jury verdict.
SO ORDERED.
